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Abstract 
 
The paper investigates the role of the government and self-regulatory reputation 
mechanisms to internalise externalities of market operation. If it pays off for 
companies to invest in a good reputation by an active policy of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR), external effects of the market will be (partly) internalised by the 
market itself. The strength of the reputation mechanism depends on the functioning of 
non governmental organisations (NGOs), the transparency of the company, the time 
horizon of the company, and on the behaviour of employees, consumers and 
investors. On the basis of an extensive study of the empirical literature on these 
topics, we conclude that in general the working of the reputation mechanism is rather 
weak. Especially the transparency of companies is a bottleneck. If the government 
would force companies to be more transparent, it could initiate a self-enforcing spiral 
that would improve the working of the reputation mechanism. We also argue that the 
working of the reputation mechanism will be weaker for smaller companies and for 
both highly competitive and monopolistic markets. We therefore conclude that 
government regulation is still necessary, especially for small companies. 
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1 Introduction 
 
In the last decades, ICT has changed the economic and political environment in the 
Western world. This technological progress imposes great challenges for companies, 
because their various stakeholders can monitor them much better. This provides 
opportunities for deregulation by the government. In particular, because of the 
watchdog function of the media and NGOs, companies are forced to uphold a good 
reputation. This might reduce market imperfections caused by lack of information. 
Whereas traditionally the government has the task to regulate the market in order to 
prevent this kind of externalities, the globalisation of the international market has 
made such direct regulation increasingly problematic. 
 The central question in this paper is whether the reputation mechanism provides 
enough incentives to companies to internalise externalities resulting from lack of 
information. For this purpose, we focus on the literature on corporate social 
responsibility (CSR). According to the Social Economic Council (2001a) corporate 
social responsibility means that an enterprise has sufficient focus on its contribution to 
public prosperity in the longer run. The contribution to public prosperity consists of 
value creation in three dimension which is called the Triple P bottom line: Profit (the 
production of goods and services), People (the consequences for people inside and 
outside the company) and Planet (the effects on the natural environment).1 This broad 
definition of CSR will be used in the rest of this paper. There are two ways through 
which reputation and CSR are connected. First, one of the conditions for the 
functioning of the reputation mechanism is that information about the past 
performance of companies is available. Providing information and offering 
transparency to the stakeholders is one of the major aspects of CSR, because this 
contributes to public prosperity. Indeed, a responsible company will respect its 
stakeholders and therefore not use information advantages to manipulate transactions 
in its own interest. Therefore, the literature of CSR provides much information about 
instruments that raise the transparency to stakeholders. A second reason for focussing 
on the literature on CSR is that a strategy of CSR is itself a way of building up a good 
reputation. There is indeed much evidence that the reputation of a company is 
positively related to its CSR effort (Turban and Greening, 1996; Fombrun and 
Shanley, 1990). If a higher reputation, in turn, leads to higher profits for the company, 
there is an incentive for the company to engage in CSR. Miles and Covin (2000) find 
empirical support that being a good environmental steward indeed creates a 
reputational advantage that enhances marketing and financial performance. Likewise, 
                                                 
1
 Instead of these three dimensions distinguished by the Social Economic Council, Carroll (1993) 
specifies four types of CSR: philanthropic, ethical, legal and economic. Furthermore, it should be noted 
that there are many other terms related to CSR, like corporate citizenship, social responsibility and 
social responsiveness. The various definitions and related terms of CSR stress that there is not a 
concise definition of CSR. 
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Williams and Barrett (2000) show that corporate philanthropy may reduce the costs 
involved with corporate criminal activity. Several other studies that investigated the 
relationship between CSR and profitability without explicitly considering the role of 
reputation, also found that CSR really pays off for companies (Simpson and Kohers, 
2002; Moore and Robson, 2002; Moore, 2001; Orlitzky, 2001; Ruf et al, 2001; Burke 
and Logsdon, 1996; Hart et al, 1996; Pava and Krausz, 1996; Zahra and Covin, 1995). 
This, in turn, would imply that the market has its own incentives to (partly) internalise 
external effects.  
The contents of the paper are as follows. In section 2, we first give a theoretical 
background of the reputation mechanism and the relation with CSR and government 
regulation. Following Graafland (2002a), we will hypothesise that the reputation 
effect is stronger when non governmental organisations (NGOs) are more active and 
the media is better developed and when the company is more transparent. The 
willingness to invest in a good reputation depends on the time horizon of the company 
and on the incentives from the labour market, goods market and financial market. In 
particular, we will argue that a good reputation is more valuable for a company when 
it increases the productivity of its workforce, when it increases its sales and when it 
increases its possibility to attract financial means at the financial market. In section 3 
we research the empirical literature on these mechanisms. In section 4 we will 
distinguish large versus small companies and investigate whether the working of the 
reputation effect differs across different types of markets. Section 5 will summarize 
our findings and consider the policy implications of our analysis.  
 
2 Regulation, the reputation mechanism and CSR: a theoretical framework 
 
This section describes the framework of the paper. First, we discuss imperfect 
information as one of the imperfections of market operation. Next, the role of the 
reputation mechanism is explained as an alternative to government regulation to 
reduce market imperfections due to lack of information. Third, we describe the 
relationship between reputation and CSR. The final section presents the framework 
and the conditions for an effective reputation mechanism. 
 
Market imperfections and lack of information 
 
One of the conditions for a good operation of free competitive markets is perfect 
information. The condition of perfect knowledge is often violated in the real world, 
because information is costly. Virtually every commercial transaction is subject to 
limited information, certainly any transaction conducted over a period of time. 
Imperfect information may be particularly harmful if it implies informational 
asymmetry. Informational asymmetry occurs when one party has more information 
about the transaction than its counterpart. Opportunistic agents may use this 
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information advantage in their self-interest, because it allows the better-informed 
party to exploit the less informed party by manipulating the quantity, quality or price 
in a way that is not easily detectable to the less informed party. This causes market 
failure. In particular, because of informational asymmetries, the less informed party 
may purchase his money to goods that he would not have purchased if he were well 
informed and this is inefficient.  
 Lack of perfect information may also enforce other market imperfections caused 
by externalities, bounded rationality, product heterogeneity and trade barriers. For 
example, lack of information forms the background of prisoner’s dilemma’s and 
related coordination problems from externalities and hold-up. The uncertainty due to 
lack of perfect information may also complicate the decision problem. As agents have 
limited cognitive abilities, this may diminish the rationality of their decisions. Third, 
lack of information may increase the heterogeneity in products. In particular, although 
product differentiation may reflect real differences among products (in function, 
design or quality), it may also be based only on the belief that there are differences 
(by advertising or brand names). Lack of information enlarges the possibilities for the 
latter strategy. Finally, lack of information may introduce trade barriers for other 
companies. For example, it facilitates illegal price agreements among oligopolists. 
Because a highly concentrated oligopoly has a relatively small number of firms, it is 
relatively easy for the managers of these firms to meet secretly or join forces by tacit 
agreements. 
 
Regulation, transaction costs, implicit contracts and the reputation mechanism 
 
Economic theory describes several institutions that help to overcome the information 
problem and prevent opportunism. One such institution is a private contract enforced 
by an independent, impartial judiciary (Bovenberg, 2002). Second, the government 
can implement public laws that force agents to behave in a cooperative way. As 
stressed by the new institutional economics (North, 1990; Williamson, 1985), these 
institutions may, however, be rather costly, because writing down all contingencies in 
law and enforcement costs may generate many transaction costs varying from 
negotiations to legal procedures. The idea of transaction costs is that they consist of 
the costs of arranging a contract ex ante and monitoring and enforcing it ex post, as 
opposed to production costs, which are the costs of executing the contract (Van de 
Klundert, 1999). Due to substantial transaction costs, the legal constraints of 
negotiated contracts and unilaterally imposed laws by the government leave 
substantial scope for opportunism, so that externalities persist. 
In view of the costs of the legal system, other more informal institutions have 
been developed to reduce the market imperfections from lack of information. These 
informal institutions rely on implicit, self-enforcing contracts in repeated game 
situations. In particular, opportunistic strategies will be prevented if agents can punish 
each other after the initial transaction. Whereas bilateral implicit contracts facilitate 
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cooperative behaviour by rewarding and/or punishing of trading partners involved in 
recurrent transactions, implicit contracts are especially efficient if the information is 
distributed to all potential future trading partners by a reputation mechanism. The 
reputation mechanism can help to enforce the implicit contract by extending the 
bilateral punishment to multilateral or collective punishment. The reputation 
mechanism only works if several conditions are met (Bovenberg, 2002). First, 
information about the agent’s past behaviour must be available to all other potential 
trading partners. Second, the agents must have a sufficient long time horizon. That 
means: they attach a large enough weight to future contacts. Third, the agents must 
believe that the strategies of the other players depend on their own decisions. There 
must be the belief of collective punishment and rewarding.2 This, in turn, requires that 
the agents have a common perception of what is considered cooperative and non-
cooperative behaviour and of how cooperative should be rewarded and opportunistic 
behaviour punished. These common perceptions can be viewed as part of the social 
capital of a society. 
If the reputation mechanism works well, collective punishment is self-enforcing: 
neither the government nor the courts have to participate in punishing cooperative 
behaviour. 
 
The reputation mechanism and CSR 
  
The reputation mechanism is one of the main causes of the current attention of 
companies to CSR. The attention for CSR results from the need to get a licence to 
operate from the society. In order to get this licence, firms have to meet the triple P 
bottom line expressing the expectations of stakeholders with respect to the company’s 
contribution to profit, planet and people (Graafland, 2002b). Firms that do not meet 
these expectations may see their market shares and profitability go down (McIntosh et 
al, 1998). Companies only succeed in convincing the stakeholders by investing 
enough in CSR. Indeed, CSR is very much a way of building up a good reputation. 
This is illustrated by many cases, in which companies started to pay attention to CSR 
after an incident that damaged their reputation (Tulder and Van der Zwart, 2003). 
 CSR comprises all kinds of measures that guarantee that the company will not 
exploit the stakeholders and misuse information advantages. In this paper, we 
distinguish between three types of measures. First, CSR relates to measures that 
protect the interests of stakeholders (like employees, customers and investors). 
Graafland et al (2003a) gives several examples, like measures to enhance good 
product quality to protect the interests of customers (by testing procedures and 
providing reliable information in advertisements) and sound accounting rules to 
                                                 
2
 This is not always necessary. If agents also have social preferences, for example that they like to be 
admired by others, social reputations may still enforce cooperation when this condition is not met 
(Bovenberg, 2002). 
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protect the interests of investors. Second, CSR relates to measures that foster the 
common good of the society at large rather than the interests of specific stakeholders 
of the company. Examples are efforts to reduce the environmental damage from the 
production process of the company. Third, a very important aspect of CSR concerns 
the transparency offered by the company itself (e.g. Herkströter, 1998). Transparent 
companies show respect to their stakeholders by informing them. Graafland et al 
(2003a) mentions several examples like the supply of information about safety, health 
and environmental aspects of the production process. 
 
The framework 
 
The relationship between regulation, imperfect information, the reputation mechanism 
and CSR can now be sketched as follows (see Figure 1). If the reputation mechanism 
works well, a company will have a high incentive to invest in CSR in order to get a 
good reputation. The reputation mechanism only works well if the three conditions 
mentioned above are met.3  
First, the strength of the reputation mechanism depends on the availability of the 
information about the past performance of the company. The more information is 
available, the more transparent is the company’s performance. The transparency 
depends on factors that are both external and internal to the company. An important 
external factor is the intertwined role of the media, NGOs and ICT.4 Through ICT, the 
world is becoming a global village in which the media is able to inform people 
increasingly what firms are doing anywhere on the globe. These better 
communication networks also strengthen the position of NGOs, as it becomes easier 
to supply information to the various media. Therefore, the market becomes less 
anonymous. An important internal factor is the transparency offered by the company. 
If companies do not provide information about its performance, it is much more 
difficult for NGOs and market parties to get informed about the economic and social 
effects of the company. For this reason, external stakeholders often demand that 
companies be transparent. Companies that are not transparent become under suspicion 
of hiding negative consequences of their operations. Therefore, transparency is not 
only a condition for the functioning of the reputation mechanism, but has also become 
one of the constituting elements of a good CSR reputation (see above). 
Second, as a good reputation only pays off in the future, investing in CSR will 
only be more important to the company if it has a long time horizon. If the company is 
especially interested in short term profits, the company has less incentives to build up 
                                                 
3
 For a theoretical model of these effects on reputation and CSR efforts, see Graafland (2002a).  
4
 It is beyond the scope of this article to investigate other relevant external factors such as the cultural 
context in which the company operates. For example, whereas transparency is an important procedural 
norm in Western society, the Asian culture is much more confidential in nature so that transparency is 
much harder to obtain. 
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Corporate social 
responsibility reputation 
 
* Serve interests stakeholders 
* Serve common good 
* Be transparent 
 
  
a good reputation and therefore to engage in CSR efforts, for the company has to 
make short term costs to get a better reputation that will lead to long term profits. 
Third, the reputation mechanism is more effective if a good reputation is 
collectively rewarded and a bad reputation collectively punished. This depends on the 
reactions of various types of stakeholders on the labour, goods and capital market. 
First, a good reputation may attract highly qualified workers, whereas also current 
workers will have a higher productivity when the company invests in its reputation.  
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Second, a good reputation could benefit the company on the goods market, in the 
sense that customers are more prepared to buy products from companies with a good 
reputation than companies with a bad reputation. A third market where a good 
reputation could benefit the company is the financial market. In particular, companies 
with a better reputation will be able to fund their investments more easily. It is our 
purpose to investigate whether this collective punishment and rewarding is indeed 
present in these three types of market. 
If all conditions for the reputation mechanism are met, companies will have a 
strong incentive to reduce market imperfections by pursuing an active CSR policy 
(arrow 9), including the transparency offered by companies. An increase in the 
transparency will again enforce the reputation mechanism, because it raises the access 
of the media and NGOs (arrow 1) and other market parties (arrow 3) to information 
about the past performance of the company and therefore enables these parties to put 
more pressure on companies to improve their CSR reputation (arrow 2 and arrow 4). 
In this way, a self-enforcing spiral may result towards stronger reputation mechanisms 
and growing transparency of companies. If the incentives for companies to invest in 
CSR efforts are not strong enough, this process may not take place and all kinds of 
market imperfections resulting from imperfect information may persist. In that case, 
the government could intervene in four different ways. First, the government could 
directly regulate the CSR efforts of companies (arrow 5). Especially enhancing the 
transparency of companies, for example by forcing social and environmental 
reporting, could be very important, for transparency also have a positive impact on 
two other important conditions of a well-functioning of the reputation mechanism. 
Second, the role of NGOs and the media could be improved by subsidizing them 
(arrow 6). Third, as companies with a stakeholder view tend to have a longer time 
horizon than companies with a shareholder view (see section 3.3), the time horizon of 
the company could also be made longer, by, for example, setting selection criteria for 
commissioners that foster a focus on the interests of other stakeholders than 
shareholders only (arrow 7). In 2001, the Social Economic Council (SER) issued an 
advice that states that the Worker’s Council should nominate one third of the total 
board of commissioners (SER, 2001b). Another possibility would be to force 
companies to have some commissioners that are representatives of NGOs. All those 
adaptations imply a better representation of the society at large in the board of 
commissioners. A fourth approach could be to stimulate collective rewarding and/or 
punishment by providing incentives to the market (arrow 8). Introducing subsidies 
and taxes can do this. For example, tax exemptions for investments in green funds 
will provide an incentive to investors to invest in responsible companies. This, in turn, 
will encourage companies to invest in CSR efforts. Also public law may help by 
coordinating views in society about which type of behaviour is non-cooperative and 
should be punished through social and economic sanctions (Bovenberg, 2002).  
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3 Empirical research: an overview 
 
In this section, we will more closely research the empirical relevance of each of the 
relations of this framework on the basis of the literature. First of all, we will 
investigate the effectiveness of the watchdog function of the media and NGOs. Next, 
we look directly at the CSR effort of Dutch companies as far as the transparency 
offered by companies is concerned. Third, we look at empirical evidence about the 
time horizon of companies. Finally, we research the strength of punishing and 
rewarding on the labour market, goods market and capital market.  
 
3.1 The role of the media and NGOs 
 
For the reputation mechanism to work, information about the actions of companies 
should be communicated to the public. In this respect, the role of the media and 
NGOs has become very important. The role of the media and NGOs has risen due to 
the changes in the economic environment during the last decades (Grolin, 1998). The 
technological development has increased communication possibilities and made it 
easier for the media and NGOs to communicate with the public and the companies. 
As a result, stakeholders are sooner or more often being informed about the actions of 
companies.  
Pressure groups act as a countervailing power to business (Smith, 1990). Kaler 
(2000) distinguishes between NGOs and campaigning groups. Campaigning groups, 
in contrast to the other NGOs, have fundamentally only a moral orientation. Other 
NGOs, for example trade unions and consumer organisations, do not have just a moral 
orientation but are vehicles to promote the sectional self-interest. Especially 
Transnational Corporations (TNCs) are targets of the NGOs, in particular those that 
are brand-based and most vulnerable to consumer boycotts. Whereas, as a 
consequence of globalisation, companies have more power and freedom, they have 
also been more frequently targeted by NGOs, who have adopted increasingly 
sophisticated strategies in dealing with them (Fabig and Boele, 1999).  
That the media and NGOs really seem to have an impact on the actions of a 
company can be highlighted by various cases, like the Kenosha case of Chrysler 
(McMahon, 1999), the Brent Spar case of Shell (Grolin, 1998; Graafland, 2002b) and 
the Dolphin-Tuna case (Wright, 2000). Educated through the NGO efforts, the news 
media played a key role in shaping the public opinion in this kind of cases (Iyengar 
and Kinder, 1987). A final recent Dutch example of the impact of the media is the 
Zembla Television program on 16 November 2001 about illegal price agreements in 
the Dutch construction sector. This not only activated the political parties, but also 
made companies more aware of CSR (Graafland, 2003a).5 
                                                 
5
 For examples of the role of the media and NGOs in the textile sector, see Graafland (2002c). 
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The strategy of NGOs, however, seems to have changed in recent years (Kong et 
al, 2002). Whereas they used to use the strategy of confrontation with the companies 
(they still use this strategy), now there is a trend to the strategy of innovative and pro-
active partnerships with the business/industry (Gruiters, 2000). Because NGOs are 
capable of giving valuable information to the companies about what matters in 
society, they will enable the companies to internalise the external effects of 
production in a better way, what will enhance social welfare. Campaigning groups 
have an expertise in tapping into public opinion that business do not have (Kaler, 
2000).  
It should be noted that the media and NGOs do not always contribute to public 
prosperity by providing information. For example, a company can be unfairly accused 
by an NGO. In the case of the Brent Spar, Greenpeace overestimated the 
environmental damage. Moreover, as NGOs have no democratic basis and only 
represent their members (with a strong focus on social and environmental values), one 
can question the legitimacy of NGOs when they induce firms to CSR (Edwards, 
1999).   
Finally, it is important to note that the impact of the media and NGOs is 
interrelated to the other factors influencing the strength of the reputation mechanism. 
In particular, the possibility of NGOs to pressure companies is both related to the 
transparency offered by the company as well as to the attitude of employees, 
consumers and investors regarding the actions of the company. If a company is not 
transparent, the NGOs do have a harder job to come to know about the (bad) actions 
of the company. And if, for example, consumers are more inclined to help an NGO 
with boycotting a company, an NGO can pursue more pressure. These other factors 
will be discussed below. 
 
3.2 Transparency offered by the company 
 
In this section we investigate the transparency offered by companies. We first 
consider financial reporting. Next, we discuss the transparency with respect to other 
issues. 
 
Financial transparency 
 
In recent years, large Dutch companies have improved their financial transparency by 
implementing some of the advices of the Commission-Peters. However, most annual 
reports lack a systematic analysis of the financial risks in the future. Furthermore, the 
transparency is sometimes lowered by the use of new, creative definitions of 
profitability and an improper use of the item ‘special costs’ (Van de Merwe, 2002). 
Because companies can choose between permitted alternative accounting rules, it is 
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tempting to manipulate the accounts in the interest of the top management of the 
company (Blake et al, 2000). 
Indeed, the financial scandals in the United States and in the Netherlands (Ahold 
and earlier Worldonline, KPN, Getronics and Baan) have made clear that the financial 
transparency of companies is still vulnerable. According to Frentrop (2002), the 
financial control of large Dutch companies is insufficient. Especially the interests of 
the shareholders of these companies are not secure. As a result, the probability of 
misuse is relatively high. According to De Vries, 7 of the 25 AEX funds made 
financial mistakes  (NRC, 24-4-2003). 
  
Transparency with respect to other issues 
 
Transparency with respect to other issues like social and environmental issues can be 
reached through different channels. In this section we focus on four instruments: 
public code of conducts, certifications and labelling, an active dialogue with NGOs, 
and social reporting and auditing. 
First, the company could explicitly state its basic responsibilities towards its 
stakeholders in a public code of conduct (Kaptein and Wempe, 1998; SER, 2001a). 
This will enable the stakeholders to hold the company responsible for its actions. In 
the Netherlands, the use of a code of conduct by companies is quite modest but rising. 
In a recent research of KPMG (2002) 43% of the companies in the three Northern 
provinces are found to have a code of conduct, but this might rise to 70% in the next 
three years. For the Southern provinces Brabant and Zeeland Graafland et al (2002d, 
2003b) find that 51% of the large companies uses a code of conduct.6 In another 
recent research for 58 large Dutch companies Graafland et al (2003a) find that 48% 
has a public code of conduct. In the chemical and banking sector almost 2 out of 3 
companies have a code of conduct, whereas for the retail sector only 18% has a public 
code of conduct. This might be explained by the fact that retail companies are 
relatively small compared to chemical companies and financial banks. Unfortunately, 
many codes of Dutch companies are not very concrete, which hampers the 
verification the compliance of the company with the code (Van Tulder, 2000).  
Second, the company could voluntarily subject itself to independent certification 
standards like the various ISO standards (Rondinelli and Vastag, 2000) and the 
SA8000 standard (www.cepaa.org). Those standards can be considered as labels with 
respect to the company’s performance.  The number of Dutch companies that do have 
a particular certificate is highly sector specific. For example, Graafland et al (2003a) 
find that 80% of the construction and chemical companies has a ISO9001/9002/9003 
certificate (measuring product quality standards) against 14% respectively 10% for 
                                                 
6
 This is similar to the findings of Ulrich et al (1998) for 550 large German and 224 large Swiss 
companies. However, as their study is already some years old, we expect that the share of companies 
having a public code of conduct in their sample is higher by now. 
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retailers and financial banks. Similarly, whereas 83% of the chemical sector has an 
ISO 14001 certificate (measuring environmental standards), this only holds for 23% 
of the construction companies, whereas the number of ISO14001 certificated retail 
and financial banks is negligible. The SA8000 certification (measuring labour 
standards) is least common and only held by about 10% in the sample of Graafland et 
al (2003a).7 The company could also enhance transparency by subjecting its product 
to a label. The labelling of products plays a role of increasing importance as a 
technique to reveal, with adequate certification, the content of a product in both a 
psychical and moral sense by reporting on a certain aspect of the product (Keyzer, 
2002). Examples of labels in the Netherlands are the so-called green label for 
sustainable electricity, certificated by the association of energy companies (Van der 
Tak, 1998) and the Max Havelaar label established by NGOs (Van Beuningen, 2000; 
De Lange and Winkler, 2000). Because these labels make it easier for stakeholders to 
identify the actions of the company, labelling will enhance the working of the 
reputation mechanism. 
 A third instrument to raise the transparency of the company is an active dialogue 
with its stakeholders. In the Netherlands, chemical companies regularly engage in 
active dialogue with NGOs. However, other companies are in general seldom engaged 
in active dialogue with the NGOs and do not think this is important (Graafland et al, 
2003a). An active dialogue could also enhance the working of the code of conduct, 
because it seems that an active dialogue sharpens the code of conduct (Van Tulder, 
2000).   
Finally, the company could issue environmental and social reports. Clarke and 
Gibson-Sweet (1999) show that corporate social reporting by UK companies escalated 
in recent years. Particularly in industries that are environmentally sensitive, such 
communication is apparent. In a Canadian study, Nitkin and Brooks (1998) found that 
51 of the 174 surveyed companies issue an environmental progress report to the 
public. They, however, recognize the fact that just few of the investigated companies 
issue the full text of their audits (just 10 out of 51). They conclude that companies in 
Canada are not yet convinced of the advantages of sustainability accounting and 
auditing. Moreover, as Nitkin and Brooks note, there is little standardization of the 
reports they investigated. This means that it is difficult to compare the various 
companies with respect to their environmental actions. For the Netherlands, Lamoen 
and Van Tulder (2001) find from a sample of 16 companies that 62 percent of the 
Dutch traded companies issue a separate social or ecological report. 19 percent of 
these companies only issue an environmental report and 19 percent only a social 
report. Almost 25 percent issue both an environmental and a social report. Especially 
companies in environmental sensitive industries, like chemical companies, issue an 
                                                 
7
 Of which 20% of the chemical sector and 10% of the retail sector. The number of construction and 
financial companies with a SA8000 certificate was zero. 
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environmental report (Graafland et al, 2003a). Public social reports, on the other hand, 
are most of the times issued by labour intensive companies, like in the construction 
sector. Some firms also include social aspects in the annual financial report. Just as 
Nitkin and Brooks find for Canada, the environmental and social reports of Dutch 
companies show a lot of differences, which makes it difficult to compare the 
performance of different firms. Standardization seems important to judge whether a 
company performs well or not. Moreover, just as in Canada, Dutch companies seem 
not yet convinced of the advantages of sustainability accounting and auditing. Some 
large Dutch companies have recently even reduced their effort in social reporting 
(Lamoen and Van Tulder, 2001).   
 Environmental and social reporting is especially useful for raising transparency if 
independent auditors check the information that the company offers. External 
verification of the actual environmental performance does, however, not take place 
normally. The ISO14001 certification, for example, only implies that companies have 
good environmental management systems to deal with environmental impacts, but 
there is no way of externally verifying the actual environmental improvements. 
Except for some best practices like Shell, this is not the case for most Dutch 
companies. For the public in general it is often not possible to check whether or not a 
company gives a true picture of its actions. For example, out of a questionnaire of 30 
questions Graafland et al (2003a) were only able to verify 10 questions on the basis of 
public information (newspaper articles, internet sites and annual report). Also 
Scholtens (1998) find in his research that the transparency of Dutch companies is not 
very high. Therefore, verifying the information of companies is difficult.  
 
3.3 Time horizon of the company 
 
A good reputation implies increased long run profits for the company (Roberts and 
Dowling, 2002). But in order to build a good reputation, the company has to make 
costs in the short run. The incentive to invest in a good reputation will therefore 
depend positively on the time horizon of the management of the company (Francois 
and Roberts, 2003; Bovenberg, 2002).  
There is empirical evidence that a long time horizon contributes to long-term 
profitability (Richardson and Waegelein, 2002; Keil et al, 2001). Compensation of 
executives not based on the long-term performance of the company, will ultimate lead 
to decisions that are detrimental to shareholder wealth (Vogel and Lobo, 2002). But 
that does not guarantee that managers do have a long-term focus.  
So the question is: Is there evidence that companies are mainly concerned about 
the long-term? Or are they mainly interested in the short term? Short-termism can be 
defined ‘as representing decisions and outcomes that pursue a course of action that is 
best for the short term but sub optimal over the long term’ (Laverty, 1996). According 
to Laverty, there are five (partly overlapping) explanations why short-termism could 
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exist in a company: managerial opportunism, stock market myopia, flawed 
management practice, fluid and impatient capital and information asymmetry. Some 
empirical evidence corroborates the first mechanism of managerial opportunism. For 
example, Harrison and Fiet (1999) find a positive relationship between CEO 
succession and organisational performance. An explanation is that new CEOs feel 
pressure to perform well in a relative short term to secure their position and therefore 
tend to cut expenditures on long-term investment area’s like R&D and pension 
funding. Especially in large public companies this problem is apparent, because 
leaders of the company change more often than in small and family owned 
companies. There are, however, also studies that found no relation between 
managerial opportunism and short-termism. Bizjak et al (1993), for example, failed to 
find any evidence that companies with CEOs near retirement were foregoing long-
term investments. The empirical literature on the influence of managerial opportunism 
on short-termism is therefore ambiguous. 
A second cause of short-termism is stock market myopia. Recently, there have 
been claims that U.S. companies are either unwilling or unable to make investments 
that are necessary for the future but that require a sacrifice of short-term profits. A 
very often-called reason for this is the pressure from the stock market (Segelod, 
2000). The pressure from the stock market to perform in the short run causes firms to 
invest in a more short-term manner than is advisable. According to Laverty (1996), 
however, other studies indicate that the stock market will also reward companies if 
they invest in R&D, a long-term investment. Furthermore, Laverty argues that the 
lack of discipline by the stock market appears to allow managers to be more short-
term oriented. Therefore, again, an unambiguous conclusion is not possible. 
For the other explanations of short termism - flawed management practice, fluid 
and impatient capital or information asymmetry - Brown and Higgins (2001) found 
that especially in the U.S. managers manage earnings surprises to raise the stock 
price. Large information asymmetries in the U.S. may be creating incentives for a 
short-run management style detrimental to long-term competitiveness. Also fluid 
capital can foster short termism. Segelod argues, for example, that short-termism of 
U.S. companies can be attributed to the fact that the largest groups of shareholders in 
the U.S. are institutional investors and that these investors are short run maximisers. 
Moreover, the U.S. shareholders have more voting rights than in the Netherlands. 
(Moerland, 1997). As many investors seem to have a short time horizon (Van Hoesel 
et al, 2001), more voting rights imply that U.S. companies may have more difficulties 
to pursue a long-term strategy. This in contrast to companies in Germany and the 
Netherlands (e.g. Gradus et al, 2000), where a stakeholder’s model is more actual and 
where companies are often controlled by stable owners who are well informed about 
their company and have a long-term commitment to the firms they control (De Jong, 
1996; Kester, 1992). In this model, employees do have more influence, as well as the 
banks, and the orientation on the capital market is less strong than under the Anglo-
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Saxon model (De Jong, 1996; Gradus et al, 2000). All those characteristics of the 
stakeholder model will lengthen the time horizon of the company. On the other hand, 
the controlling power of large shareholders that are not part of the Board of 
Commissioners (Cremers, 1999) is relatively weak in the Netherlands. This may 
create room for managerial opportunism. The time horizon of Dutch companies may 
even become shorter when more small investors are given more voting power 
(DeJong et al, 2001). Indeed, some Dutch CEOs indicate that the short time horizon 
of especially the small investor makes it more difficult for the company to carry out a 
long-term strategy and therefore shortens the time horizon of the company (Hilgers et 
al, 2001). Still, we conclude that the time horizon of Dutch companies is relatively 
long compared to U.S. companies. This is confirmed by research of Segelod (2000) 
who finds that managers think that American firms indeed have the shortest time 
horizon, whereas Japanese firms have the longest time horizon and European 
companies take the intermediate position. 
 
3.4 Reputation and the labour market 
 
The pay-off from a good reputation depends crucially on the reactions of various 
stakeholders. In this section, we will consider the impact of a good reputation of the 
company on the labour market. We will first research the reputation effects of good 
human resource management (HRM) policies on the hiring of new employees and on 
the commitment of current employees. Next, we discuss the effects of a good ethical 
culture on employees. 
 
HRM reputation and quality of the labour force 
 
A good HRM reputation may be rewarded both by potential employees as well as by 
the current working force. The worth of the company depends for a great extent on the 
satisfaction and quality of the workforce of the company. More satisfaction of the 
workforce, in turn, will lower turnover rates and increase the readiness of employees 
to invest in relation-specific assets (Boot, 2000). This will benefit the company. There 
is indeed empirical evidence that companies with a good HRM reputation are able to 
attract better employees (Albinger and Freeman, 2000; Turban and Greening, 1996). 
This especially holds for companies that target at highly educated workers. It seems 
that by evaluating the company, the potential employees weigh the organisations’ 
performance on employee issues most heavily. Therefore managers should invest in 
the working environment.  
 Besides the reputation effect on potential employees, investment in good HRM 
will also have a direct favourable influence on the performance of the company by 
stimulating the commitment of workers to the company. Commitment can be defined 
as the feeling of responsibility for the company’s common goals independent of any 
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direct revenue that the worker obtains. A famous research confirming the existence of 
commitment is Akerlof (1982), who showed that some groups of workers contributed 
substantially more than was required. Good HRM stimulates this natural source of 
energy. Commitment of employees cooperating in a network of relational contracts 
within the company is one of the key success factors that other firms cannot easily 
copy, because developing such a company culture takes a long time (Kay, 1993; 
Pfeffer, 1994; Becker and Gerhart, 1996). Good relational contracts with and between 
its workers and commitment to the company’s goal stimulate a cooperative ethical 
attitude. Individual workers are prepared to subject their own interest to the common 
goal of the company, based on the trust that other workers will do the same and that 
everybody will share in the additional common revenues of the company made 
possible by the commitment of all workers (Hosmer, 1996). This makes it possible 
that internal prisoner’s dilemmas are optimally solved from the perspective of the 
group. When the trust between the company and the workers or between workers for 
some reason disappears, the organisation needs more formal mechanisms and explicit 
contracts to direct the behaviour of employees. These formal instruments may be 
more expensive and might induce non-cooperative behaviour and inflexibility. 
Many empirical researches find a positive correlation between HRM and 
company performance (Delaney and Huselid, 1996; Huselid et al, 1997; Stanwick and 
Stanwick, 1998; Ahmad and Schroeder, 2003). Investments in a good HRM 
reputation therefore pay off in the labour market and therefore there is an incentive for 
the company to set up such a program. Besides these direct tests, the positive 
relationship between HRM and profitability is also confirmed by indirect tests. For 
example, Huselid (1995) and Brouwer et al (2001) find that attention to the problems 
of older workers reduces the number of workers that leave the company. This reduces 
the costs involved with the selection and training of new employees. As many 
workers have unique and valuable competencies that are difficult to copy, it might be 
hard and costly to find new suitable candidates.  
 
Ethical climate and job satisfaction 
 
Whereas a good HRM reputation will have a direct impact on the hiring of new 
workers and the commitment of current employees, the quality of the workforce may 
also be positively influenced by the company’s ethical standards. In particular, several 
studies have found a positive relationship between the ethical climate in a company 
and job satisfaction (Deshpande, 1996; Viswesvaran and Deshpande, 1996, Sims and 
Keon, 1997, Koh and Boo, 2001, Viswesvaran and Ones, 2002). The term ‘ethical 
climate’ can be conceptualised as those perceptions in organisations that affect 
decisions that bear ethical content (Victor and Cullen, 1987, 1988). Examples are 
perceptions with respect to caring (concern for the well being of the people in the 
company), law and code (acting in accordance with professional laws and standards), 
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the company’s rules, commitment to the company’s interest and independence (act in 
accordance to individual morals and conscience). 
A good ethical climate can impact the quality of the workforce in several other 
ways. First, as Barnett and Schubert (2002) show, a good ethical work climate leads 
to more trust in the company (Ruppel and Harrington, 2000), higher commitment of 
the employee, lower absenteeism and turnover, higher profitability and productivity, 
and more favourable job attitudes and behaviours (Koh and Boo, 2001; Sims and 
Keon, 1997). Second, a good ethical climate also reduces misconduct of employees 
(Treviño et al, 1998; Weaver and Treviño, 1999; Vardi, 2001). Third, a good ethical 
reputation may indirectly contribute to job satisfaction and lower turnover of 
employees by invoking positive reactions from external groups (Riordan et al, 1997). 
When external groups appreciate the company, the employee is more likely to enjoy 
his or her job and less likely to quit.  
 
3.5 Reputation and the product market 
 
A good reputation does not only invoke rewarding behaviour from employees, but 
may also have a favourable impact on the customers of the company. But how 
effective is this mechanism? To answer this question, we investigate the behaviour of 
consumers. This section is divided in two parts. First, we will research whether or not 
consumers punish companies that harm the own interests of consumers and reward 
companies that meet their expectations. Second, we will investigate whether or not 
consumers have a preference for buying goods that contribute to the common good 
and are prepared to pay an additional premium for these products.  
 
Reaction to damage of customer’s interest 
 
Evidence shows that customers indeed punish companies if they damage customer’s 
interests. Archer and Wesolowsky (1996) find that owners of durable goods tend to 
have a tolerance towards single negative incidents with regard to product or 
manufacturer loyalty, but are not tolerant towards more than one such incident. Also 
Landon and Smith (1997) find that, whereas short term changes in quality hardly 
impact the price that consumer are willing to pay for a product, persistent movements 
in quality do have an impact. Furthermore, positive experiences of consumers can 
counteract negative critical incidents. This implies that a good reputation can help to 
reduce the damage from a critical incident. Kimes (1999) finds a direct relationship 
between product quality and operational performance. In her research, Kimes finds 
that defective hotels earn less per available room than non-defective hotels. 
Furthermore, another research shows that a one-point increase in the consumer 
satisfaction index of a Business Week 1000 firm has been calculated to be worth 
about $94 million or 11.4% of the average return on investments (Anderson et al, 
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1994). This indicates that the consumers will reward companies with more reliable 
products.  
The willingness to reward products that protect the interests of consumers is also 
confirmed by the rise in the consumption of biological produced products. Consumers 
have become more aware of the potential health hazards of agricultural products 
produced on a traditional mass scale. Notwithstanding the fact that the price of 
biological produced products is 20 to 30 percent higher than regular produced 
products (Van de Kolk, 2002), the total market for biological products increased with 
23 percent to 355 million euro in 2001. 
It should be noted, however, that the effectiveness of the reputation mechanism 
through consumer reactions is limited if the consumers have a relatively short 
memory. An example is the Ford Pinto case. In this case, Ford had deliberately 
chosen for a dangerous position of the gas tank in the Ford Pinto, causing the death of 
many motorists in the seventies. When this became publicly known, the American 
consumer was furious and Ford had to terminate the production of the Pinto 
(Velasquez, 1998). However, the incident was soon forgotten and caused no 
permanent damage to the reputation of Ford. As Graafland (2002a) argues, this may 
reduce the incentive to internalise externalities from safety hazards of the product.  
 
Demand for goods with high social value 
  
Goods with a high social value that serve the interest of the society at large may both 
generate a quantity premium as well as an additional price premium. We first discuss 
the effects on the demand of such products. Second, we investigate the price premium 
that consumers are willing to pay for this type of goods. 
Several empirical studies show that a good social reputation of a company 
facilitates the support of consumers by buying or not buying the goods, especially in 
the retail sector (Alexander, 2002; Maignan, 2001; Brown and Dacin, 1997; 
Handelman and Arnold, 1999; Marymount University, 1999). In addition to the direct 
impact on the buying decisions of customers, the social reputation of a company 
exerts an influence on product evaluations and consumers responses to new products 
through their influence on the corporate evaluation. There is evidence that a negative 
social reputation ultimately can have a detrimental effect on overall product 
evaluations, whereas a positive social reputation can enhance the product evaluations 
(Brown and Dacin, 1997). Also Handelman and Arnold (1999) and Maignan (2001) 
show that marketing actions with a social dimension generate consumers’ support for 
the organisation. These findings confirm the appropriateness of CSR as a marketing 
instrument. 
Besides rewarding responsible companies by additional product demand, 
customers can also punish companies that produce goods that are damaging for the 
common good. As Smith (1990) notes, over the last fifteen years consumer boycotts 
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have become more frequent, better organized, and identified with a much broader 
range of issues. At least 300 consumer boycotts in the US had been reported in 1990 
alone. This represents an increase of 769% from the 39 reported in 1984 (Koku et al, 
1997). Smith (1990) concludes that the cases are illustrations of consumer boycotts 
being used in the social control of business. This shows that consumer boycotts in 
reaction to a poor social reputation can operate as a social control mechanism. Also 
other studies provide empirical evidence for social purchasing behaviour. For 
example, Marymount University (1999) finds that if consumers are aware of a retailer 
that sold garments made in sweatshops, 76% would avoid shopping at that store. 
A good social reputation may also impact the price of the product. Indeed, 
consumers seem quite willing to pay for social product features (Auger at al, 2003). 
Marymount University (1999) finds that 86% of the thousand consumers surveyed 
would be willing to pay a 5% mark-up to ensure sound production practices. Also 
Bird and Hughes (1997) find evidence of the consumer’s willingness to pay a 
premium for products of companies with a good social reputation. In one survey, 5% 
of the surveyed consumers is a totally committed social shopper, 18% claims to try to 
buy social products ‘as far as possible’, 56% are slightly social and 17% expressed no 
interest in social products. The premiums the ‘social’ consumers wanted to pay 
ranged between 10 and 18 pence in the pound. 
However, in the Netherlands and other European countries there is still a 
significant group of consumers that does not value a social product position. Only 2 to 
3 percent of the coffee-consumers is prepared to pay for Max Havelaar coffee. This 
relatively low market share can be explained by the fact that many consumers seem 
not prepared to pay substantially more for fairly traded coffee and that Dutch 
consumers are in general quite brand loyal (De Lange and Winkler, 2000). 
Furthermore, while the range of fairly paid products is regularly extended (with for 
example chocolate), the growth of the number of consumers of these products is quite 
modest (Van Beuningen, 2000). This also holds for other sectors, like the textile 
sector. Elliot and Freeman (2001) found that activists only have limited success in 
catalysing consumers and companies to change their behaviour to improve sweatshop 
conditions. Consumers seem not prepared to pay a substantial price differential for the 
sake of a more socially and environmentally sustainable method of production 
(Graafland, 2001, 2003b). Because of these experiences, most Western retailers are 
not pro-actively fostering innovation in the environmental aspects of the clothing. The 
commercial benefits are too uncertain. Only a small proportion of committed 
consumers is prepared to pay for social and environmental issues linked to clothing. 
In Germany the ‘green’ market niche accounts for about 1-2% of the clothing market 
(Robins and Humphrey, 2000).  
This passive attitude of customers is maybe due to a lack of information. Many 
consumers seem still quite ignorant of the social features that comprise the products 
they consider and purchase (Auger et al, 2003). Maybe a better transparency, for 
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example by labelling products, will make consumers more prepared to pay for these 
products. Another explanation is that the additional price to be paid for these ‘social’ 
goods provides an incentive to free riding of most consumers: although they value the 
positive social consequences of these goods, their self-interest is more served if other 
consumers pay the price for these goods. In that case, there is still a market 
imperfection, although not due to a lack of information. A final explanation is that 
citizens (and thus consumers) are not really interested in the positive social effects of 
these goods. In that case, the low market shares of social goods do not signal a market 
imperfection. 
 
3.6 Reputation and the capital market 
 
A third market where a company could profit from its good reputation is the financial 
market. In this section, we will first investigate the empirical evidence of investor’s 
reactions to companies that neglect the interests of investors. Second, we will 
investigate whether or not investors have a preference for ethical investments and are 
prepared to pay an additional premium for these shares.  
 
Reaction to damages of investor’s interest 
 
There is substantial evidence that companies are penalized in the financial markets for 
behaviour that may harm the interests of investors (Gunthorpe, 1997; Rao and 
Hamilton, 1996; Davidson III et al, 1994; Badrinath and Bolster, 1996; Folmer, 1998; 
Soppe (2000)). A possible explanation for this penalizing is that the profitability may 
decline due to huge fines or compensation payments. However, there also seems to be 
an additional reputational penalty, because the loss in investor returns is normally 
much bigger than expected on the basis of the expected fines and compensations 
(Soppe, 2000). The explanation for a lower share price could be that investors 
perceive more risk of the stock (Badrinath and Bolster, 1996). Soppe (2000) shows 
that especially fraud of a company implies a negative return of the Dutch companies 
and therefore a decrease of the worth of the company.  
Most well known are the cases of unethical behaviour of companies because 
of illegal activities, like the current gulf of companies that violated financial reporting 
rules. Davidson III et al (1994) find that their shareholders will punish companies 
when they engage in illegal activities. Specific types of crime such as bribery, tax 
evasion, theft of trade secrets, financial reporting violations and violation of 
government contracts were associated with abnormal negative stock market returns. 
Also illegal price agreements belong to this category. A recent Dutch example is the 
fraud in the construction sector. Just after a television program that showed that well-
known large Dutch construction companies regularly participate in secret price 
agreements, the stock values of these companies fell by more than 10% (Graafland, 
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2003a). Even more dramatic was the reduction of the stock value of Ahold after the 
publication of unsound accounting practices in the U.S. 
The crucial question is, however, whether these reactions are serving as a 
deterrent for the companies. Out of the 96 companies that committed crimes in the 
70s, 49 allegedly committed crimes in the 80s. This could indicate that a stock price 
penalty is not always a sufficient deterrent. This could be explained by the fact that 
the learning effect is just for a short time, because the management changed in the 
time period (Davidson III et al, 1994).    
 
Ethical investment 
 
Ethical investment is one of the fastest growing areas of finance (Sparkes, 2001). 
Ethical investment can be defined as the exercise of ethical and social criteria in the 
selection and management of investment portfolios, generally consisting of company 
shares. In contrast, the sole purpose of normal investments is to maximize financial 
return. 
Also in the Dutch financial markets the importance of ethical investment has 
increased (Otten and Koedijk, 2001; Soppe, 1998). Especially from 1996, the number 
of ethical savers in relation to normal savers increased. This is probably the 
consequence of the introduction of a tax exemption for so called ‘green savers’. This 
can be concluded when comparing the Netherlands with Belgium, where no tax 
stimulation exists. In Belgium, ethical saving is less popular (Benijts and Scholtens, 
2001). Another motive for ethical investing is that the risk of these funds are lower 
than the risks of non-ethical funds (Otten and Koedijk, 2001). 
Besides the financial motives, ethical investment may also be motivated by social 
and ethical concerns of the investors (Rivoli, 1995). However, whereas ethical 
investors have ethical concerns, most of them are not prepared to sacrifice their 
financial requirements to meet these concerns (Mackenzie and Lewis, 1999). There is, 
however, also evidence that ethical investors keep those investments even if they 
perform badly (Webley et al, 2001). Furthermore, several studies show that people 
who have pro-environmental attitudes are prepared to take a small loss in order to 
invest in companies labelled as environment-friendly (Pava and Krausz, 1996; 
Mackenzie and Lewis, 1999).  
 Likewise, the evidence of punishment of alleged unethical behaviour is mixed. 
Gunthrope (1997) finds that the financial markets will on average impose a 
statistically significant one-day penalty of approximately 1,3% and a 2,3% penalty 
over a seven-day period for publicly traded companies that engage in unethical 
behaviour. Rao and Hamilton (1996) show that the actual stock performance for those 
companies that are reported to act unethically was lower than the expected market 
adjusted returns. This means that there is evidence that the company is being punished 
 21
for bad behaviour8. However, information about environmental damage or 
discrimination of the company does not always lead to structural negative returns for 
the company. Only if the company is fined for their environmental damage, the stock 
price will fall (Badrinath and Bolster, 1996). Also Warren (2002) finds that 
shareholders are sometimes not very concerned about the company’s unethical 
actions.  
 
4 Size and market form  
 
In the previous section, our analysis of the working of the reputation mechanism was 
rather general. In this section, we investigate in more detail the impact of the size and 
the impact of market form in which the company operates.  
 
Size 
 
In the Netherlands, the market share of large companies was around 50% in 1998. The 
other part consisted out of the medium and small companies (De Boer, 1999). 
Therefore it is important to investigate whether there is a difference in the behaviour 
of small companies and the behaviour of large companies. 
There are a number of key differences between small and large companies. First, 
NGOs will have few incentives to scrutinize small companies, because it is practically 
not possible for them to look after each small company. It is more interesting for 
NGOs and the media to focus on large companies with their limited power, because 
this will attract more public attention. Second, small companies will generally use less 
formal instruments to pass information to the public. Graafland et al (2003b) find that 
large Dutch companies make more use of instruments that foster the transparency of 
companies, like a code of conduct, ISO certification and social reporting. Also 
Jeucken and Van Tilburg (1999) found that large Dutch companies do more often 
have an ISO14001 certification than small companies. On the other hand, because 
small companies are often operating on a limited local scale, they have more direct 
contacts with their stakeholders which facilitates the transparency of the company. So 
there is also less need for those companies to use formal instruments to disseminate 
information. Third, with respect to the time horizon, there are also several contrasting 
forces at work. On the one hand, large companies may have strategic assets that 
reduce the competition and enables them to have a long-term view. Indeed, research 
indicates that large multinationals seem to have a longer time-horizon than other 
companies in their industry (Segelod, 2000). Furthermore, larger companies are, in 
contrast to smaller companies, normally forced to have a board of commissioners, 
                                                 
8
 Sometimes, companies are punished by NGOs who bought shares of the company to have some 
voting power. Such a campaign was done in the Brent Spar case in 1997 (Sparks, 2001). 
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which could also lengthen the time horizon. On the other hand, as argued in section 
3.3, companies with a quotation on the stock market may be more subject to short-
term pressure from the capital market and face more CEO rotation. Therefore, it is not 
a priori clear whether a small company would have a shorter or longer time horizon 
than a large company. An ambiguous conclusion also holds for the reward of a good 
reputation on the labour market, product market and financial market. Whereas small 
companies are less visible and more anonymous than large companies on the labour 
market and product market at large, small companies may be less anonymous at the 
local level. At the financial market, the incentive to reputation building will probably 
be lower because a small company is normally not traded at the stock market. 
However, if there would be punishment, the learning effect in small companies will 
probably be higher, because there is less CEO rotation. 
On average, empirical research seems to point that the reputation mechanism 
works less well for small companies than for large companies. For example, Spence et 
al (2000) find that the possibilities of a market conform environmental policy are 
limited for the small entrepreneur, because the company will find it difficult to get its 
environmental efforts rewarded by the market. Furthermore, Jeucken and Van Tilburg 
(1999) found that large companies are more active in caring for the environment. 
Graafland et al (2002) find that large Dutch companies have a more positive 
perception about the impact of a good CSR reputation on long-term added value for 
the company than small companies. They also find that large companies perform 
better with respect to a number of concrete measures including the provision of 
individual training programs to employees, provision of information about safety and 
environmental effects to employees, prevention of disability, controlling the labour 
conditions of suppliers, supply of sustainable product in product assortment, share of 
profits invested in reduction of environmental damage, and share of profits used for 
social local projects. Apparently, large companies feel that the reputation effect from 
high CSR efforts is worthwhile the cost.  
We therefore conclude that the reputation mechanism will be stronger for larger 
than for smaller companies. We therefore suspect less self-regulation in the MKB 
sector and therefore it could be a task for the government to foster collective forms of 
self-regulation at the branch level that stimulate internalisation of externalities.  
 
Market form 
 
Unfortunately, we found no empirical information about the relationship between 
market form and the strength of the reputation mechanism. Therefore, the analysis of 
this section is mainly theoretical. 
As Milgrom and Roberts (1992) argue, reputation is more important in markets 
where there is more need for trust, companies have a longer time horizon and if 
companies are more visible and have larger size. In sectors that approximate perfect 
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competitive markets, the reputation mechanism is not necessary, because perfect 
competitive markets are not subject to imperfect information about the quality and 
price of the product. Therefore, indirect information about the product offered by the 
past performance of the company is superabundant. Indeed, the reputation mechanism 
is just one of the ways to correct for lack of information on imperfect markets in order 
to approach perfect competition. Moreover, in a perfect competitive market, the 
companies are more anonymous because of the large number of competing firms. 
Non-anonymity is, however, one of the conditions for reputation. 
For monopolies, the reputation mechanism will probably also be relatively weak, 
because the reputation mechanism only works if stakeholders can punish the 
company. As the consumers do not have any alternative, the costs for boycotting the 
company may be very high for them. The net benefits of a good reputation for a 
monopolistic company is therefore less than for a non-monopolistic company in the 
customer market. Transparency will probably also be lower, because there is less need 
to. Moreover, as investors face a lower risk of consumer boycotts, they will be less 
inclined to react to changes in the reputation of the company. Only on the labour 
market employees are still able to reward and punish monopolists for their reputation. 
We suspect, therefore, that in a monopolistic product market the reputation 
mechanism will be too weak to internalise economic, social or ecological 
externalities. 
 Reputation effects will probably be more important for monopolistic competition. 
Whereas consumers have the market power to punish companies, reputation may pay, 
in particular if the heterogeneity of product is based on perceived differences (by 
advertising or brand names) rather than by real differences in product function, design 
or quality. Still, because of the large number of companies operating in a 
monopolistic competitive market, the risk of being damaged by NGO-led actions is 
relatively small. Therefore, we expect that the reputation mechanism is still relatively 
weak. 
The reputation mechanism will therefore be most relevant for oligopolistic 
markets. Whereas competition is apparent here, the companies in this type of market 
are very visible and easy targets for NGOs. Furthermore, companies in these sorts of 
markets are normally quite big. Therefore, this seems the market where the 
investment in reputation will be greatest. 
 
5 Summary and policy implications 
 
Table 1 summarizes the main findings of this paper and gives some examples of 
possible government actions.  
First, our research indicates that the media and NGOs work relatively well. Their 
role has increased as a result of ICT. However, the possibilities of these 
countervailing powers are still hampered by a lack of transparency by companies. The 
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government could (and already does) strengthen the role of NGOs by providing 
subsidies directed to their watchdog function. 
Second, the transparency of companies in the Netherlands seems to be rather 
weak and therefore an important condition for a well-functioning of the reputation 
mechanism is not completely met. One way to stimulate financial transparency is by 
self-regulation by commissioners, for example by voluntary codes of conduct. 
Reducing the number of commissionerships per commissioner can also increase the 
control. Third, reduction of the options of the top management may reduce the 
incentive to boost the profitability in the financial report (Van de Merwe, 2002).9 Also 
social and ecological transparency can be stimulated by an increase in codes of 
conduct, certifications, environmental and social reporting and an active dialogue with 
NGOs. The government could set some minimum standards for codes of conduct 
(Kolk et al, 2001) and foster standardization of social reports, which enables the 
stakeholders to compare the various companies. Too much regulation to improve the 
transparency of companies may, however, be too costly and generate additional 
transaction costs. 
 
Table 1 Reputation mechanisms and policy implications 
Determinant  Strength of effect Examples of government actions 
Media, NGOs and 
ICT 
Media and NGOs are active in 
watching companies  
- Subsidize countervailing power of NGOs 
  
Transparency 
companies 
Rather weak - Standardization of reporting 
Time horizon 
company 
Dutch companies have relatively long 
time horizon compared to U.S. 
companies 
- Change the composition of the board of 
commissioners and voting rights of large stable 
shareholders. 
Labour market Incentives are quite strong  - Provide information about HRM efforts of 
employers 
Product market Evidence is ambiguous  - Subsidize consumer organisations or labelling 
systems 
Financial market Evidence is not overwhelming - Improve voting rights large shareholders 
- Subsidize ethical investments 
 
Third, the time horizon of Dutch companies seems relatively long in the 
Netherlands. It is, however, difficult to determine whether the time horizon of the 
                                                 
9
 Another issue is the independency of accountants. This can be improved by the following measures: 
let the relationship between accountant and company only last 7 years maximally; let the board of 
commissioners choose the accountant instead of the management of the company; forbid a combination 
of accountancy and other services delivered by the accountancy bureau to the company; make the 
revenues of the controlling accountant publicly known in the annual report of the company. 
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companies is long enough (in absolute terms). In order to stimulate a long time 
horizon, more active long-term forms of shareholding should be encouraged. Large 
shareholders should be under a duty to be more active and vocal in corporate 
governance processes. The government should change the composition of the board of 
commissioners and improve voting rights of large and stable shareowners. More 
voting rights for small shareholders may, however, hamper the working of the 
reputation mechanism.  
Fourth, our research indicates that the labour market provides a number of 
incentives to invest in a good HRM reputation and ethical climate. The government 
could enhance the reputation mechanism by giving information about HRM policies 
of employers. The council of Social Affairs and Employment in the Netherlands, for 
example, have developed an employability index which enables employees to look 
which sector gives employees the best possibilities to develop their own 
employability (De Grip et al, 1999).  
Fifth, the incentives from the consumer market are less obvious. Although 
consumers are sometimes prepared to punish companies with a bad reputation and to 
reward companies with a good reputation, there remains a large portion that does not 
react whereas the duration of consumer responses is relatively short. A traditional way 
of government intervention is to provide subsidies for ethical produced products and 
tax products that generate damage (Kruitwagen et al, 2002). In addition, the 
government could stimulate the provision of information about ethical products. Curlo 
(1999) shows that the provision of negligence information heightens consumer 
concerns for safety and firms’ ethical behaviour, and increases the proportion of 
consumer choices in favours of the brands sold by manufacturers with a favourable 
track record for quality. Furthermore, a relevant task of the government could be to 
watch that the information about products is reliable. This can be reached be helping 
companies or sectors to set up a reliable product or process label.  
Sixth, the financial market seems to provide modest but growing incentives to the 
reputation mechanism. There is substantial evidence that the loss of a good reputation 
reduces the stock value of the company (in particular in the case of illegal actions). 
However, it is uncertain whether this really induces companies to prevent this kind of 
actions in the future. Furthermore, although ethical investment is growing, the largest 
share is still invested in normal funds. The government could enforce these incentives 
in several ways. For example, it could encourage long-term investment and improve 
the voting rights of large and stable investors (see above). In addition, it could 
subsidize ethical investments.  
Overall, we conclude that the reputation mechanism certainly helps to reduce 
market imperfections. This especially holds for large companies operating in 
oligopolistic markets and markets characterized by monopolistic competition. For 
small companies and companies operating in monopolistic markets, the strength of the 
reputation mechanism is less obvious. Too much faith in the self-enforcing working 
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of the reputation mechanism is unwarranted for these companies. Hence, government 
regulation remains important, especially with respect to the creation of transparency. 
A well ordered law system will also help private agents to determine what kind of 
behaviour should be rewarded or punished.  
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